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ABSTRACT 
Interactive cockpits have been used since the early 00’s in 
many aircraft cockpits, but the use of interactivity still 
remains limited to non-critical functions even in the most 
recent aircrafts. Indeed, engineering such interactive 
systems is still a challenge and their engineering has not 
reach the Design Assurance Level required for critical 
functions. In interactive cockpits, interaction takes place 
through graphical input devices and keyboards (such as the 
Keyboard Cursor Control Unit in Airbus family) while the 
behavior of the User Interface (UI) must be compliant with 
the specifications defined in ARINC 661 standard. The 
tool-supported three-fold approach presented in this paper 
proposes means for increasing the assurance level of 
interactive systems. The approach includes a formal 
description technique for describing each component of an 
interactive system (detection and prevention of 
development faults), a command and monitoring technique 
dedicated to interactive systems components (detection of 
natural faults) and a segregation runtime environment 
(prevention of faults propagation) We report on the 
implementation of a Flight Control Unit (FCU) panel using 
this approach, inspired by the FCU of the A380. 
Keywords 
User Interfaces, Interactive cockpits; model-based 
development, dependability 
INTRODUCTION 
In classical cockpits (such as the glass-cockpit [14] 
introduced by Airbus in the early 80’s) input from pilots 
takes place through physical objects such as knobs, buttons, 
side stick, … while output is distributed on digital displays 
and dials each of them being managed by dedicated 
hardware. In this generation of cockpits, input and output 
are processed in an independent manner leaving the 
connection between them to the pilot (through cognitive 
processing usually supported by the collocation of input 
and output devices in the cockpit). Dependability of these 
cockpits is mainly addressed by formal description 
techniques (for fault prevention) and redundancy (for fault 
tolerance) which (during operation) enables pilots to enter 
information via multiple input devices and receive 
information through multiple redundant displays. 
With the introduction of the ARINC 661 specification [2] 
in the 00's, the new generation of aircraft (e.g., Airbus 
A380, A350 WXB, Boeing 787 …) features graphical user 
interfaces (GUI) in their cockpit. On the user side, these 
graphical interfaces offer integrated management of input 
and output through graphical devices, interactive widgets 
(radio buttons, text boxes …) very similar to the ones 
available in standard interactive systems (e.g., office and 
home computers). On the technical side, such interfaces 
require complex software components (such as windows 
managers) to connect input devices to interactive 
components on the graphical displays. This technical 
complexity calls for specific methods and tools for 
engineering such interactive systems and this is why GUIs 
in interactive cockpits are currently only used for non-
safety-critical functions. 
The use of graphical interfaces in the cockpit brings a lot of 
advantages such as increasing the upgradability of the 
cockpit, decreasing pilots’ workload or improving 
bandwidth between flying crew and the cockpit. For all of 
these reasons, aircraft manufacturers (such as Airbus) are 
studying the possibility of replacing hardware control 
panels by graphical interfaces, even for safety-critical 
functions. This raises the issue of the dependability 
increase of graphical interfaces and the challenge is now to 
reach the same level of dependability for them as the one of 
previous generation of cockpits. Even in the field of non-
critical systems reliability of interactive application is 
clearly an issue, usually handled by manufacturers through 
repetitive patches and by users through regular reboots. To 
increase the development assurance level of interactive 
systems, we proposed a three-fold approach based on the 
use of formal description techniques to detect and remove 
development faults [8], software patterns for detecting 
natural faults [4] and segregation of hardware and software 
for avoiding faults propagation [1]. 
The paper is structured as follows: next section details the 
issues raised by engineering interactive systems and outline 
the solutions proposed in this paper. Section 3 introduces 
the case study that is used throughout the paper to 
demonstrate the applicability of the approach. It is a 
“guiding thread” to explain the proposed approach and to 
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make it more concrete. The fourth section provides an 
overview of the various components of the approach 
dedicated to the development of reliable and fault-tolerant 
interactive systems. Section 5 describes the implementation 
of the approach that is compliant with ARINC 653 
specification. The last section concludes the paper and 
highlights perspectives and future work. 
PROBLEM SPACE AND OVERVIEW OF THE 
CONTRIBUTION 
Failure Modes Taken Into Account 
Concretely, improving development assurance level of 
interactive systems aims at avoiding four possible failures 
as required by the European Aviation Safety Agency CS-25 
(Certification Specifications for large aeroplanes [6]): 
x Loss of control: loss of function so that control (from 
crew member to aircraft systems) is not performed. 
x Erroneous control: malfunction so that control is 
performed in an inappropriate manner (wrong control, 
control sent with a wrong data or unexpected control sent 
without crew member action). 
x Loss of data display: loss of function so that the data 
display (from aircraft system to display for crew member) 
is not performed. 
x Erroneous data display: malfunction so that the data 
display is performed in an inappropriate manner or 
unexpected change of data display without the aircraft 
system asking for it. In both cases, the wrong data display 
may be misleading to crew members. 
Considered Fault Model 
In this paper, we consider that the failures presented above 
can be caused by several type of faults. These type of faults 
constitute the fault model that encompasses software faults 
such as design faults during the system development and 
physical faults in particular transient single or multiple bit-
flips caused by electromagnetic fields or radiation [18]. The 
evolution of modern IC components may lead in the next 
future to a higher probability of physical faults in operation. 
Although the recommendation for avionics systems is 100 
FITs over 25 years lifetime, the current Deep Sub-Micron 
(DSP) technology may lead to a failure rate up to 1000 
FITs, only during 5 years operational life time [19]. This is 
major worry in the avionics industry since this tendency 
has two bad sided effects, i) the reduction of the life time of 
the systems and ii) the increase of the failure rate due to 
hardware faults. In addition to this, the complexity of the 
stack of software layers may lead to a large number of 
residual software faults impacting the software. 
Overview of the Contribution 
In this paper, we focus on the interactive system 
dependability as a computer-based systems; human errors 
during operation are out of scope of this work. Although 
human errors can be an important source of problems in 
avionics, human reliability aspects must be considered 
independent from the dependability of the cockpit platform. 
Furthermore, development software faults and natural 
faults in operation that we considered in this study are not 
influenced by operator’s behavior. 
This paper presents a three-fold approach targeting at 
improving development assurance level of interactive 
systems. First, at development time the UI and all its 
underlying software components are described using a 
formal description technique dedicated to the formal 
modelling of interactive systems. This approach (see Fig. 2) 
has been improved over the years and already applied in the 
area of interactive cockpits [5] and targets at detecting 
faults made at development time by formal analysis of the 
models. Second, the approach embeds the COM/MON [23] 
design pattern for detecting natural faults occurring during 
operation (e.g., multiple bit flips [18]). Third, we propose a 
fault tolerant architecture based on the ARINC 653 
standard, more precisely on an IMA (Integrated Modular 
Avionics) kernel providing time and space partitioning to 
avoid propagation of faults from one faulty component to 
another one.  
Fig. 2. Complementary approaches to increase development assurance 
level of interactive systems 
CASE STUDY: THE FCUS APPLICATION 
Interactive Cockpit Architecture 
The interactive Control and Display System (CDS) of the 
Airbus A380 is composed of 8 outputs devices called DUs 
(Display Unit) and 2 input devices (called KCCUs 
(Keyboard and Cursor Control Unit) which gather in the 
same hardware component a keyboard and a trackball (see 
Fig. 1). A DU device is composed of a LCD screen, a 
graphics processing unit and a central processing unit 
Segregation 
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Fig. 1. Simplified architecture of an interactive cockpit (compliant with the ARINC 661 standard) implementing the FCUS application 
running an ARINC 653 [1] operating system kernel. The 
DUs are connected together and with the KCCUs through 
four segregated and redundant CANs networks (Controller 
Area Network). The DUs are connected to the aircraft 
systems through the AFDX network (Avionics Full DupleX 
switched Ethernet). The UA (User Application) is the 
interactive part of the avionics functions belonging to the 
aircraft systems. 
The interactive system architecture in the cockpit (depicted 
in Fig. 1) and the interactive applications are based on the 
ARINC 661 specification [2] which specifies, first the 
communication protocol between the CDS and the aircraft 
systems and second, the software interface of interactive 
objects (called widgets) which can be buttons, editboxes, 
checkbuttons, ... as in standard user interfaces. 
Fig. 3. Snapshot of the FCUS application (left: EFIS CP ; right: AFS CP) 
The Flight Control Unit Software Application 
In the Airbus A380, the Flight Control Unit is a hardware 
panel (i.e. several electronic devices such as buttons, knobs, 
displays …) providing two services: one managing aircraft 
information called EFIS (Electronic Flight Information 
System) and the other one managing the autopilot called 
AFS (Auto Flight System). Several of the actions that can 
be achieved by the pilot through the use of the Flight 
Control Unit are critical. Therefore, the Flight Control Unit 
is a good candidate when considering the replacing of 
critical hardware panel by graphical interfaces. 
We use as a case study an interactive software version of it, 
providing the same services. This application is called 
FCUS (for Flight Control Unit Software) and is composed, 
as shown in Fig. 3, of two interactive pages: 
x The Electronic Flight Information System Control 
Panel (EFIS CP) which allows configuring piloting and 
navigation displays. 
x The Auto Flight System Control Panel (AFS CP) 
which allows the setting of the autopilot states and 
parameters. 
The FCUS application is composed of 123 widgets of 11 
different types that are quite representative of the 77 
widgets types defined by the ARINC 661 specification [2]. 
Interactive system Functioning 
To understand the functioning of the FCUS application, we 
take the concrete scenario of a pilot engaging a new aircraft 
heading (the direction pointed by the aircraft) on the FCUS.  
In this case study, we will more particularly focus on the 
generic part of the interactive system; our main interest is 
thus to ensure that the CDS (server and widgets in Fig. 1) 
of the interactive system processes correctly input events 
from crew members, and send graphical commands to the 
LCD screen according to the data received from the UA. 
Sequence diagrams are really good candidates to identify 
all the functions and elements of a system; they helps in 
understanding the system functioning and enables the 
identification of the function which, in case of failure, may 
lead to one of the failure modes presented in previous 
section. They thus support both the system formal 
development and the application of the COM/MON 
approach. 
The sequence diagram of the engagement of a new aircraft 
heading is presented in Fig. 4. When the autopilot is active 
and in mode Heading/Vertical-Speed, it is programmed to 
maintain the heading chosen during the creation of the 
flight plan. If the pilot needs to modify the value of the 
aircraft heading during the flight, he/she can use the FCU 
application as the following: 
1) The pilot clicks on the heading_ebn EditBoxNumeric,
the server processes the KCCU event and sends it to the
concerned widget (the heading_ebn) that processes it
by opening itself and sending a rendering update
notification to the server.
2) The pilot types the desired value. The server forwards
the event to the heading_ebn that updates its value and
asks the server for a rendering update.
3) The pilot validates the value by pressing the validation
key. The server forwards the event to the heading_ebn
that processes it and asks the server for a rendering
update.
4) At the end of this processing, the heading_ebn sends
an A661_STRING_CONFIRMED(newValue) event to
the UA. The UA processes this event by updating the
temporary heading value, checking its consistency and
sending a validation to the heading_ebn.
5) The pilot move the cursor to the engagement button, the
server processes the events and updates the cursor
rendering.
6) The pilot clicks on the heading_ppb
PicturePushButton to engage the new heading value, the
server processes the KCCU event and sends it to the
concerned widget that processes it and sends a rendering
update notification to the server.
7) At the end of the process of the click, the heading_ppb
sends an A661_EVT_SELECTION event to the UA. The
UA processes it, engages the new heading value and
notifies the pilot of this engagement by asking the
heading_ebn to change its text color, the 
heading_ebn processes this and sends a rendering 
update notification to the server. 
A THREE-FOLD APPROACH TOWARDS INCREASE 
ASSURANCE LEVEL FOR INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS 
This section details the proposed approach. Fig. 5 positions 
our contribution with respect to the abstract diagram 
presented in Fig. 2. The interactive system development is 
achieved through the use of the ICO formal description 
technique; the COM/MON design pattern is applied to the 
CDS and the segregation is achieved through the use of 
ARISSIM, an ARINC 653 simulator. 
Fig. 5. Instanciation of the complementary approaches to increase 
development assurance level of interactive systems 
A Formal Description Technique for Detection and 
Prevention of Development Faults 
To prevent the occurrence of software development faults, 
we propose the use of a formal-description technique 
dedicated to the specification and verification of interactive 
systems: the ICO (Interactive Cooperative Objects) 
formalism [17]. This formalism uses high-level Petri nets 
[12] to describe the behavioral aspects of the interactive
system and concepts borrowed from the object-oriented
approach to describe the structural and static aspects of the
interactive system. This formalism enables the handling of
the specific aspects of interactive systems such as their
event driven nature. Its main interest is to provide a way for
the interactive system developer to create non-ambiguous
and concise models compliant with the system
specifications.
The ICO formalism is supported by a tool named PetShop 
providing means to develop ICO models and formally 
verify properties over them [21] and also providing a 
runtime support for models’ execution. As the models are 
directly interpreted at run-time by this tool, the verified 
properties will be still valid at execution time. An overview 
of this preventive approach is done in [11] and its 
application for interactive cockpits is described in [5]. 
A COM/MON Approach for Detection of Natural Faults 
For the detection of natural faults affecting the system 
during operations, we propose an approach relying on the 
conventional COM/MON architecture developed for fly-
by-wire functions [23] (also known as self-checking 
architecture). The COM/MON approach relies on a 
command (COM) channel and a monitoring (MON) 
channel. The command channel ensures the function 
allocated to the classical component and the monitoring 
channel ensures that the command channel operates 
correctly. This architectural fault tolerance design pattern 
thus enables the detection of inconsistencies due to natural 
faults and is also valid for certification authorities. 
More particularly, we apply it to the software elements of 
the CDS (cf. server and widgets in Fig. 1) thus leading to a 
self-checking CDS. In that case, the COM is then the 
classical interactive component, realizing the interactive 
functions. The MON is responsible for the validation of the 
COM outputs and is able to send error notifications in case 
of inconsistency. 
The challenge in the COM/MON approach is the definition 
and implementation of the monitoring component. We 
propose to define it as a property checker. The monitoring 
component is thus responsible for the verification of several 
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Fig. 4. Sequence diagram of the engagement of a new aircraft heading 
assertions associated to the interactive objects organization 
and their semantics in operational context. These assertions 
are associated in operation to runtime monitors. The 
identification of the assertions based on i) a failure mode 
analysis (using a FMECA [7]), ii) formal definition of the 
assertions associated to items failure modes and iii) the 
definition of the associated assertion monitors. A full 
account of the process leading to the identification of the 
assertion and their monitors is given in [10]. 
To deal with crash faults but also to handle its fail-silent 
behavior and enable fault recovery, the self-checking CDS 
must be replicated, due to space constraints, we do not 
focus on these aspects in this paper and more information 
about it can be found in [11]. 
A Segregated Architecture for Prevention of Fault 
Propagation 
The segregation and error confinement relies on isolating 
the MON component from the COM component in 
separated error confinement areas called partitions, thus 
preventing fault propagation between the two components. 
The COM, composed of the classical CDS is located in a 
first partition while the MON, composed of all the assertion 
monitors is located in another partition. 
The implementation relies on a basic ARINC 653 [1] 
operating system. ARINC 653 (Avionics Application 
Standard Software Interface) is the specification of a real-
time operating system providing Time and Space 
Partitioning (TSP) for safety-critical avionics systems. 
Multiple applications of different software criticality levels 
(Development Assurance Levels – DAL [8]) can run on the 
same hardware in the context of Integrated Modular 
Avionics (IMA). TSP means that each partition is allocated 
a time budget and has its own protected memory space. 
TSP provides error confinement between executable code 
running in two different partitions. The APEX (APplication 
EXecutive) defines the API on this runtime support. Within 
each Partition, multitasking is allowed. The APEX API 
provides services to manage partitions, processes and 
timing aspects, as well as partition/process communication 
and error handling. The APEX defines communication 
channels called blackboard and buffer inside a partition, 
and called sampling and queuing between partitions. They 
rely on two communication policies: 
x Sampling and Blackboard only keep track of the last 
message and a read operation does not erase the 
information. 
x Queuing and Buffering implement a conventional 
FIFO queue. All the messages produced by the sender are 
received by the receiver. 
Fig. 7 depicts the architecture of the mapping of our 
COM/MON architecture within an ARINC 653 operating 
system: the interactive part of appli1 is running in partition 
P1 on DU1, its monitoring counterpart MON_appli1 is 
running in P1 on DU2. A backup implementation of the 
former, named appli 2, can be implemented in the same 
way (for the replication purposes explained in previous 
section), but its COM part is running on DU2 and its MON 
part running on DU1. 
Fig. 7. Simplified overall physical architecture 
The pilot interacts with a given application through the 
KCCU. All inputs are delivered to both COM and MON 
components running on 2 different displays using a reliable 
broadcast protocol. The inputs are processed by the COM 
whereas the MON keeps them for later verification. The 
action performed by the COM, i.e. corresponding to the 
behavior of a given widget, produces an output that is 
delivered to the UA. The UA also receives the results of the 
check from the MON, before processing the results of the 
COM, i.e. an A661WidgetEvent. 
The major time frame cycle for the partitions running on a 
DU must be lower than 33 ms to ensure correct rendering 
on the display [22]. In practice, the drift between the two 
clocks has a bounded temporal impact, just one cycle to 
validate an A661WiggetEvent. An extensive study of this 
problem can be found in [16]. 
Fig. 6. Excerpt of the ICO model of an EditBoxNumeric behavior 
APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH ON THE FCUS 
CASE STUDY 
Formal Description of the FCUS 
The FCUS application is developed using the ICO formal 
description technique presented in previous section. 
Therefore, all the software parts (white boxes in Fig. 1) of 
the CDS (server and widgets) are developed using the ICO 
formalism and following the specifications of the 
ARINC 661 standard [2]. The server is composed of two 
ICO models, one responsible for the hierarchy of widgets 
(called SceneGraph) and the other one responsible for all 
KCCU event management. Each widget is composed of an 
instance of an ICO model describing its behavior. Fig. 7 
depicts an extract of an EditBoxNumeric (EBN) 
behavior: 
1) The actual state of this EBN is: i) waiting for a user
action (token in place Idle), ii) visible (token in place
Visible) and iii) active (token in place Enabled). In this
case, if the EBN receives a click (token in place
SIP_processMouseClicked), it will process it (transition
processMouseClicked1 producing a token in place
editBoxClicked).
2) The EBN needs then to ask the server for a special mode
called CagingMode (transition openingCaging) in which
the user can only interact with this one widget, using the
keyboard. When the server has activated this mode
(token in place cagingOpened), the EBN switches to
edition mode (token in place Editing).
3) The EBN is then able to process any keyboard input
from user (token in place SIP_processNormalKey) in
order to update the editing value.
4) When the user validates the editing value by pressing the
validation key (token in place
SIP_processValidationKey), the EBN asks the server for
closing the CagingMode (transition
validation_CloseCaging).
5) The EBN checks the format of the new value and sends
(if correct) an A661_STRING_CONFIRMED event
along with the new value.
6) The EBN is then waiting for the validation of this value
by the UA (token in place waitingForUA). When the
EBN receives the UA validation (token in place
SIP_setEntryValidation), the EBN switches to the Idle
mode with the new value.
Due to lack of space, we only depicted in Fig. 7 the normal 
behavior of the EditBoxNumeric. All the arcs that are not 
completely depicted in the Figure are responsible for all 
abnormal behaviors. Fig. 7 only shows 24 places, 9 
transitions and 42 arcs while the whole EditBoxNumeric 
model contains about 65 places, 60 transitions and more 
than 200 arcs. 
The complete modeling of the FCUS case study is 
composed of the modeling of the server (composed of two 
ICO models) and a total of 12 types of widgets. These 
widgets are representative of the 77 defined in the ARINC 
661 standard and a total of 123 instances of them are 
running in the final application. 
Application of the COM/MON Approach to the FCUS 
As explained in previous section, the challenge while 
applying the COM/MON approach is the definition and 
implementation of the monitoring component. A presented 
previously, a safety analysis of the FCUS is the starting 
point of the development of the MON component. This is 
based on an analysis of the system functioning using 
sequence diagrams such as the one presented in Fig. 4. The 
analysis is done following the FMECA process [7] and is 
achieved through the completion of a FMECA table (see 
excerpt in Fig. 8). Each row of the FMECA table is leading 
to the definition of an assertion describing the correct 
behavior of the function studied. 
To exemplify the FMECA table and the associated 
assertions and assertion monitors, we have selected one 
row of the FMECA table, typical of all the widgets ones. 
This raw is depicted in Fig. 8 and corresponds to the 
management of a KCCU event by a widget; here, it 
corresponds to the management of a mouse click by a 
PicturePushButton. We omit here the potential causes (fault 
model early defined) and the risk level (replaced by the 
consequence classification, corresponding to the failure 
mode classification presented earlier). Each row of the 
FMECA table corresponds to one function (item) of the 
widget and identifies the three failure modes of this 
function: 
x FM1: no execution. 
x FM2: erroneous execution. 
x FM3: unexpected execution. 
1 2 34 5 6 
Item Failures modes Local effects Upper-level effects Consequence classification 
ppb.processMouseClicked
Process the click, send the 
corresponding 
A661_EVT_SELECTIONto 
the UA and send an update 
notification to the server 
No execution 
ppb.processMouseClicked.FM1   
Upon the receipt of a kccu input event, the 
widget does not send any 
A661_EVT_SELECTION 
The pilot command is not sent to 
the aicraft system Loss of control 
Erroneous execution 
ppb.processMouseClicked.FM2   
Upon the receipt of a kccu input event, the 
widget sends a wrong A661_Event(val) 
A wrong command is sent to the 
aircraft system 
Erroneous 
control 
Unexpected execution 
ppb.processMouseClicked.FM3   
The widget sends an 
A661_EVT_SELECTION without 
receiving any kccu input event 
A command is sent t the aircraft 
system without any user action 
Erroneous 
control 
Fig. 8. Excerpt of the FMECA tables: process mouse click in a PicturePushButton 
The assertion describing the correct behavior of the 
management of a mouse click by a PicturePushButton is 
depicted in Fig. 10. 
Finally, each assertion is leading to two assertion monitors; 
the first one allowing to detect the failures modes FM1 and 
FM2 and the second one enabling to detect the failure mode 
FM3. The two assertion monitors for the management of a 
mouse click by a PicturePushButton are depicted in Fig. 9. 
For the FCUS case study, a complete FMECA has been 
done to identify the major risks and derived the 
corresponding error detection and recovery mechanisms to 
ensure safety. The complete FMECA table (for the server 
and the widgets) enabled the identification of lead to the 
identification of potential failures that are not all critical, 
leading to the identification of around 30 critical assertions. 
A Segregated Runtime Environment for the FCUS 
Our first mockup (see Fig. 11) has been developed on a 
network of 3 computers running UNIX and ARISSIM, an 
ARINC 653 simulator (see next subsection). PC1 runs a 
JVM and PetShop executing all the ICO models of the 
COM component in a partition, PC2 runs the C 
implementation of MON component in another partition. 
The UA part of the interactive system (running in PC3) is 
implemented in the same way than the COM component. 
However, since the server handling the widgets and the 
widgets are the focus in this paper, we do not detail the 
models for the UA that are used as test drivers for our 
mockup. 
Fig. 11. Mockup SW and HW architecture. 
A Runtime Support: ARISSIM, an ARINC 653 Simulator 
Our ARINC 653 simulator has been developed on UNIX. It 
implements the TSP concepts and the mechanisms for 
partition communication. The functions provided to the 
partitions are not limited to the APEX API as the simulator 
is more a tool for proof of concepts than a real simulation 
environment. The UNIX system call interface is accessible, 
the development of applications can be done in C/C++, and 
we can launch a Java Virtual Machine in a partition. The 
setup of a simulation is described in two configuration files 
(one for communication channels/ports, on for partitioning 
temporal specification). 
Space partitioning, i.e. memory management and 
protection, relies on UNIX and is implemented using a 
wrapper of the UNIX fork system call. The fork 
mechanism allocates a complete independent page table for 
each process newly created. A partition is a UNIX multi-
threaded process. 
The partition execution time is parameterized but fixed 
during the execution of the simulation. Time partitioning is 
implemented using UNIX signals (SIGSTOP and SIGCONT). 
These two signals are uncatchable and thus always lead 
respectively to a pause of the process (move process in 
waiting status) and to the continuation of the process (move 
process to ready status). 
Inter-partition and intra-partition communication channels 
are implemented on UNIX sockets. The Queuing mode is 
based on a stream socket point-to-point communication to 
A1.AM1: ppb.processMouseClicked.assert 
//MON state 
boolean w.visible, w.enabled; 
// ppb.processMouseClicked.assert 
int errorDetected = -1; 
if (functionCall == {source, w, processMouseClicked, 
parameters}){ 
if (w.visible == true && w.enabled == true){ 
boolean timeOut = startTimer();  
} 
} 
while (!timeOut){ 
 if (! timeOut && 
widgetEvent.contains({w,A661_EVT_SELECTION,∅}){ 
errorDetected = 0; 
sendError(functionCall, errorDetected); 
} 
} 
if (timeOut && errorDetected == -1){ 
errorDetected = 1; 
sendError(functionCall, errorDetected); 
} 
A1.AM2: A661_EVT_SELECTION.assert 
//MON state 
boolean w.visible, w.enabled; 
// ppb.processMouseClicked.assert 
int errorDetected = 0; 
if (widgetEvent == {w,A661_EVT_SELECTION, ∅}){ 
if (functionCall.contains({source, w, processMouseClicked, 
parameters}) && w.visible == true && w.enabled == true){ 
errorDetected = 0; 
sendError(functionCall, errorDetected); 
}else{ 
errorDetected = 1; 
sendError(functionCall, errorDetected); 
} 
} 
Fig. 9. Implementation of the assertion monitors in C for the assertion A1: 
process mouse click in a PicturePushButton 
A1: Process mouse click in a PicturePushButton 
Let w be a PicturePushButton, 
let f = {source, target, functionName, parameters} be a function 
call, 
let We = {source, eventName, parameters} be a widget event 
f = {source, w, processMouseClicked, parameters}  
w.visible = true  w.enabled = true
 
We = {w, A661_EVT_SELECTION, ∅}
Fig. 10. Formal definition of the assertion A1: process mouse click in a 
PicturePushButton 
ensure that every message sent is received. Sampling mode 
is implemented in the same way but only keeps the last 
message sent, and the reading is non-destructive.  
The simulator is open-source and available for use through 
a Web link with its documentation [3]. 
COM and MON Implementation 
The COM component is composed of ICO models 
instances that are executed at runtime using PetShop, 
running on top of a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). 
The MON component needs to be implemented in a 
diversified way from the COM component to deal with 
remaining software faults in the underlying runtime support 
(JVM and PetShop). The MON component is thus 
implemented in C for obvious efficiency reasons. As 
depicted in Fig. 12, it is composed of a state image (State 
Image), responsible to store and reconstruct within the 
MON component the state of the COM component (for 
instance, the widget tree), that is used as an oracle by each 
assertion monitors (AM1 … AMn). Each assertion monitor 
is implemented as a C function. The verification relies on 
the state image, some observable items coming from the 
COM through ARINC653 communication channels and all 
the KCCU events. 
This implementation allows us to address both the issue of 
fault confinement (by means of the ARINC 653 
architecture) and of diversity between COM and the MON 
while focusing on faults specific to interactive systems 
even though they remain at widget and server levels. 
Fig. 12. Software architecture of the MON component 
COM & MON Communication 
Communication is achieved through the communication 
facilities provided by the ARINC 653 layer. Two 
communication channels are opened between the COM and 
the MON: a sampling channel and a queuing channel. Any 
information that is required for the verification of an 
assertion is transmitted through one these channels. The 
type of channel used depends on the data transmitted. The 
sampling channel is used when the last updated value of a 
given variable is required (for instance for the verification 
of data value); the queuing channel is used for the 
transmission of events (for instance all the widget events).  
Hooks are needed to capture the appropriate data for the 
verification; the hooks can be inserted in the 
implementation of the models or directly in the models 
runtime support. In both cases, observable items (event or 
data) are sent to the MON through an inter-partition 
communication channel. In our experiment, hooks are 
implemented as a Java class, using the models runtime 
support to observe the changes in the ICO models. 
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
We have proposed a three-fold approach for the 
development of dependable interactive systems, based on 
the use of a formal description technique for their 
development together with a segregated fault tolerant 
software architecture. The proposed fault-tolerant approach 
is based on a COM/MON architecture that has already 
proven its efficiency for improving the dependability and 
certification of fly-by-wire functions [23]. The 
implementation targets interactive cockpits and is 
compliant with ARINC 661 and ARINC 653 specifications. 
We have implemented a mockup for this approach ensuring 
that moving from analog interactive systems to digital 
systems does not decreases the dependability level of such 
interactive systems. The current implementation is a proof 
of concept and should be followed by a real 
implementation in an industrial context to perform 
performance evaluation and optimizations. 
Previous work has been done in each of the three elements 
of the approach (formal description techniques, fault-
tolerant mechanisms and segregation) but they have not 
been integrated in a single framework.  
The paper has demonstrated that the approach is applicable 
to a large scale study. So far, this is the only one that has 
been performed even though the formal description part has 
been extensively applied to multiple User Applications and 
even to the user interface server [5] for more than 10 years. 
The potential introduction of interaction techniques more 
sophisticated (than the WIMP ones proposed by the 
ARINC 661 standard) raises additional difficulties (e.g., 
dynamic instantiation of input devices) that have been 
presented (together with some solutions) in [13]. The 
approach is resource consuming, requires deep involvement 
of expert users but the availability of tools such as PetShop 
and ARISSIM provide extremely valuable support. This 
consumption of resources is acceptable in a safety critical 
context and is not higher than current approaches such as 
the ones currently used in the avionics domain (e.g., 
SCADE and SCADE Display).  
On the perspectives side, it is important to note that 
whatever the implementation of the CDS is, analog or 
digital, with fault tolerance or not, perception, decision and 
actions from the flying crew are of primary importance. 
The user interface, the user interactions and the underlying 
software mechanisms keep the operator in the loop. This 
means that the flying crew is in charge of triggering 
commands (using KCCU and physical knobs) and 
assessing the current state of the aircraft (mainly based on 
perceived information on displays). In the field of safety 
critical systems the Human Factor has been most of the 
time perceived as the weak element of the Organization-
Operator-Technological System triangle and as the main 
source of errors and failures. Indeed, as reported in [15] 
79% of fatal accidents in aeronautics in 2006 have been 
attributed to human error. It is important to note however, 
that such perception has evolved over the last decade and 
that some authors represent the human as the last defense 
against organizational and technical failures [20]. Dealing 
with the human in assessing potential source of failures, 
requires looking at the human in a generic term as well as 
looking at the human in the specific case of the tasks and 
goals he/she has to achieve. This aspect has not been 
presented in this paper but is of the highest importance as 
dependability issues have to be addressed at global socio-
technical system level. Indeed, the explicit representation 
of operators’ tasks makes it possible to identify training 
needs, workload and added complexity in presence of 
system or human error. However, dependability, usability 
and user experience are usually conflicting thus requiring 
careful management of the trade-offs when interactive 
critical systems are designed as demonstrated in [9] by the 
same research team in our joint-project with Airbus. 
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